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Population And Food

Abstract

The impact of population size and its rate of growth on levels
of living in general and on the demand and/or supply of a basic
necessity such as food has long attracted the attention of economists
·and economic demograph ers.

This paper reviews some recent models of

the world food economy in the context of a rapidly growing population
in the developing countries.

The models range from population

carrying capacity exercises devoid of any economics to dynamic general
equilibriu m models.

It would appear from the projection s of various

models that the demand for food likely to arise from anticipate d
income and population growth during the next two to three decades or
even longer can be met.

Yet for an analysis of the long term

interactio n between population growth and economic developme nt these
models are inadequate , for the reason that the behaviour al response of
household s, producers, investors and inventors to anticipate d
imbalances between supply and demand in terms of changes in fertility
behaviour , in the rate and character of technical change, in the rates
of saving investmen t in physical and human capital, etc. are not
adequately modeled.

At any rate, contrary to the widespread

impression , it is not rapid population growth but inappropr iate public
policies towards agricultur e that seem to account for the failure of
_many developing countries to assure an adequate level of food
consumptio n for their citizens.

I
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Populat ion And Food
T. N. Sriniva san

1.

Introdu ction
The impact of popula tion size and its rate of growth on levels of living

food
in general and on the demand for and supply of a basic necess ity such as
has long attract ed the attenti on of econom ists and economic demogr aphers.

Al

on de
most all recent analyse s of the food-po pulation nexus necess arily focus
velopin g countri es.

Most of. the contemp orary develop ed countri es have crossed

a slow
the stage of demogra phic transit ion and are current ly experie ncing only
income
growth, if any, in the size of their popula- tions. Given their high real
lar) is
levels, their demand for food in general (and for food grains in particu
is
unlikel y to grow rapidly , and as such, their role in the world food economy
im
more sigfnif icant on food supplie s and exports , althoug h the impact of the
ports of a few develop ed countri es such as the USSR on
food and feedgra ins could be importa nt.

interna tional trade in

For example , while the cereal imports

and
of industr ialized market econom ies was viruall y unchanged at about 65.5
from
66.l million tons respect ively in 1974 and 1982, the imports of USSR rose
from
7.8 to 40.1 million tons and the imports of less develop ed countri es rose
is
64.2 to 95.6 million tons (World Bank (1984), Table 6, p.228). Still, it
grains
fair to say that among the factors that influen ce the import demand for
by the USSR popula tion growth is unlikel y to be signifi cant.
One could disting uish several channel s of influen ce in each directi on in
the relatio nship between populat ion and food.

(i) Popula tion growth (and hence

the size of the populat ion in the future) obvious ly affects the demand for
food.

With growth of income and its distrib ution among socio-e conomi c groups

-3kept unchanged, an exogenous increase in the rate of growth of population of
any group will imply a slower growth of its income per bead and hence a slower
growth of its food demand per head.

However, as long as the elasticity of de

mand for food per bead with respect to income per bead does not exceed unity,
the rate of growth of total demand for food of each group will increase with an
increase in the rate of growth of its population.

(ii) To the extent demand

elasticities differ across socio-economic groups, changes in income distribu
tion will have an impact on demand even if aggregate income growth is kept
constant.

And the process of population growth itself could alter income

distribution. (iii) Population growth could affect food supplies in several
ways; by changing potential labor force in quantity as well as quality, by

changing the availabilities (per worker) of other inputs such as land (through
changes in the size distribution of farms and the extent

of land fragmenta

tion), by influencing the technology of cultivation a la Boserup (1965, 1981)
and Simon (1981), by influencing the environment (thereby affecting output per
unit of land) through changes in the process of soil erosion and degradation
etc.

In the opposite direction there is of course the potential Malthusian

relationship between availability of food, fertility and mortality. It bas been
pointed out (World Bank, 1982) that a majority of the world's poor are either
landless agricultural laborers or cultivators with small land holdings.

It is

also suggested that poor have higher fertility rates compared to the population
as a whole and fertility is influenced by household income earning opportuni

ties (particularly for women).

To the extent the process of growth of agri

cultural output affects land tenure, farm size distribution, and income earning
opportunities, fertility rates and population growth rates may be affected as
well.
In modeling the food population nexus, at one extreme is an approach

-4which exogenous ly projects the likely size of population at some future date
(or alternativ ely its time path from some initial date) with this size influ
encing food supply (as well as real income) only through its relationsh ip to
the size of the work force and total food demand by the identity that aggregate
demand e4uals population size times per capita demand, with per capita demand
being a function of per capita income.

Such projection s made independe ntly for

several countries or regions are aggregated to yield the likely excess supply
or demand for food for country groups such as low income countries , all less
developed countries etc.

This approach very often will either assume away any

response of food supply or demand to changes in food prices or alternativ ely
treat the projected supply-dem and imbalance at unchanged prices as an indicator
of the need for price change and/or policy interventi on.

At the other extreme

is an approach in which the processes of population growth, technolog ical and
environme ntal change, the evolution of outputs, prices, incomes and exchange
(between individua ls, firms and other entities within and across countries and
over time) are all interdepen dent.

The time path of the economy of each coun

try and the global system in such an approach will in general depend on the
evolution of variables that ar~ exogenous , including stochastic shocks to the
system, as well as the response (rational and equilibra ting or otherwise ) of
agents to the shocks!

Such a dynamic, stochastic general equilibriu m approach,

while attractive in theory, is obviously impractic al.
This paper is limited in scope.

It does not cover general issues

ing to population growth and economic developme nt.

relat

These have been covered in

depth by McNicoll (1984) and less deeply and more conventio nally in W0rld Bank

(1984) (see also Simon and Gobin (1980)).

Nor does it cover determina nts of

fertility, labor force participa tion, rural-urba n migration , access to land and
other assets etc. mainly because other papers at this conference deal with

-5them.

Thorny philosophical, moral and ethical issues relating to population

policy are not discussed.

In particular articulation of value judgements in

volved in defining objectives of any population policy which is a necessary
prelude to a discussion of 'optimum' population growth policy is not attempted.
It reviews some recent models of the world food economy in the context of rap
idly growing population in the developing countries. Also a model of the Indian
economy will be used to assess the impact of alternative assumptions regarding
the growth of Indian population until the year 2000, the impact being measured
in alternative ways: growth of GNP, its composition, size distribution of in
come among rural and urban population, the distribution of population (rural
and urban) according to per capita caloric intake.

The models reviewed vary:

in their approach to modeling production and supply, whether they distinguish
countries and regions as well as socio-economic groups within countries in de
riving demand, whether they are partial or general in modeling market equilib
rium and whether they are static or truly dynamic.
Section 2 discusses studies based on the concept of population carrying
capacity, i.e. the maximum population that can be sustained indefinitely into
the future.

By themselves these are of limited use,

than economic analyses,

being technical rather

based as they often are on either known or currently

foreseen technological potentials.

Besides they have very little to say wheth

er it is appropriate in some well defined sense for population to grow up to
carrying capacity from below (and if so, bow rapidly) and how to adjust (and

how quickly) if the current population exceeded carrying capacity.

This sec

tion also includes a brief discussion of recent population projections for ma
jor areas of the world.

Section 3 provides a brief description of the

projec

tions of Food and Agriculture Organization (FA0). Section 4 is devoted to a
discussion of the grain-oilseed-livestock (GOL) model under~ying the food sup

-6ply-dema nd projecti ons of the Global 2000 report to the Presiden t of the USA.
Section 5 reports on the results of some simulati ons with the India model as
well as some general results from the linked system of country models (of which
India model is a part) put together at or under the auspices of the Interna
tional Institut e for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).

Section 6 is devoted to

a discussi on of other projecti ons such as those of Linnemann et al, 1979),th e
Resource s for the Future (RFF), and Internat ional Food Policy Research Insti
tute (IFPRI).

Section 7 takes up the feed-bac k-effects in the food-pop ulation

nexus neglecte d altogeth er or inadequa tely addresse d in the models of the pre
vious sections .

This discussi on will necessar ily be speculat ive. Section 8

conclude s the paper with a discussi on of issues for further research .

2.

Projecti ons of Populati on Size and Populati on Carrying Capacity
In Table 1 data from World Bank (1984) dealing with populati on change and

economic developm ent are reproduc ed.

Under the standard projecti on the popula

tion of the less develope d countrie s will increase from 3413 million in mid
1982 to 4835 million and

8313 million respecti vely in years 2000 and 2050 rep-

resentin g an average rate of growth of about 2.2% per year up to 2000 and a
little over 1% per year for the .subsequ ent 50 years.

The projecti on of the

Bureau of the Census in the U.S. (reprodu ced in the Global 2000 report) are
somewhat higher, the medium value being 6351 million for the world in 2000,

with the high (low) value being 6798 (5922) million.

The less develope d re

gions were projecte d to have a populati on ranging from 4648 million (low val
ue), 5028 million (medium value) and 5420 million (high value). The medium var
iant of the United Nations projecti on for the world populati on is 6141 million.
Though these projecti ons differ somewhat, any of them, if realized , would mean
a substan tial growth by historic al standard s.

-7It is temptin g to compare the projec ted popula tion, say by the
year 2050,
(even though a hypoth etical station ary popula tion level would
be somewhat high
er) with the potent ial for feedin g this popula tion. The study
on popula tion
carryin g capaci ties under taken jointl y by FAO, United Nation s
Fund For Popula 
tion Activi ties (UNFPA) and IIASA (Higgi ns et al, 1983; Shah et
al, 1984) provides a basis for such a compa rison, though it exclud es some major
countr ies
e.g. China.

The object ives of the study were" ••• to ascert ain on the basis
of

land resour ce invent ories, the potent ial popula tion suppor ting
capaci ties in
the develo ping world with variou s levels of inputs . And, second
, to compare
these estima tes with data on presen t and projec ted popula tions
••• " (Higgi ns et
al, 1983, p.5.). Some of the earlie r attemp ts review ed in Shah
et al, (1984)
involv ed the estima tion of potent ial arable land and potent ial
yield per hect
are in differ ent region s of the world to arrive at an estima te
of potent ial
output in grain equiva lent units.

Dividi ng the output estima te by an assumed

consum ption level per head, one obtain s an estima te of popula
tion poten tial.
Such estima tes varied depend ing on variat ions in each of the
three inputs : es
timate s of arable land, yield per hectar e and per capita consum
ption needs. The
range was enormo us: from a low estima te of 902 Millio n by Pearso
n and Harper in
1945 to 147 billio n by Clark in 1967 (Shah et al,198 4, p.5)1
The FAO-UNFPA-IIASA study differ s from the earlie r studie s in
its use of
a more disagg regate d data base and superi or method ology.

Briefl y stated , it

uses an overla y of a climat e map provid ing spatia l inform ation
on temper ature
and moistu re condit ions on to a soil map provid ing spatia l data
on soil tex
ture, slope and phase. This resulte d in dividin g the study area
into grids each
coveri ng an area
ing

of 100 square kilome ters area.

In all 14 major climat es dur

growin g period were disting uished with normal (i.e. contai ning
a humid

period ) length of the growin g period (LGP) divide d into 13 interv
als and inter

-8mediate (with no humid period) LGP being divided into 6 interval s.

Fifteen

most widely grown food crops, namely, wheat, rice, maize, barley, sorghum,
pearl millet, white potato, sweet potato, cassava, phaselou s bean, soyabean ,
groundnu t, sugar cane, bananas /plantain and oil palm were consider ed.

Three

alternat ive levels of farro technolo gy (low, intermed iate and high) varying from
no change in existing cropping patterns , no use of fertiliz ers and pesticid es
and no mechani zation to optimum use of plant genetic potentia l, along with
needed fertiliz ers and pesticid es and full mechani zation are postulat ed.
The soil characte rstic, climate, growing season length, technolo gy and
cropping pattern together with the requirem ent that producti on be sustaina ble
(i.e.tha t appropri ate fallowin g requirem ents and soil conserva tion measures are
allowed for) determin e the producti on potentia l in each of the soil-clim ate
grids. These are then aggregat ed to yield producti on potentia l at the level of
a country.

After deductio n of seed, feed and wastage one then obtains the

crop-wis e potentia l output availabl e for human consump tion.

Livestoc k produc

tion potentia l was also assessed both under the assumpti on that only grasslan d
will be used to support herds and under the assumpti on crop residues and by
products wil be used as well. (Shah et al 1984, p.32).

Given the average en

ergy (measure d in kilo calories per day) and protein (in grams per day) re
quiremen ts based on the 1973 recomme ndations of an expert committe e of FAO and
World Health organiza tion (WHO) and the age and sex distribu tion of the popula
tion of a country and the producti on availabl e for human consump tion in terms
of energy and protein,

the maximum populati on that can be supporte d can be

determin ed. The results are shown in Table 2.

In this table "critica l" coun

tries are the ones that cannot meet the basic food needs of their populati on
even if all their arable land were devoted to growing food crops and "limited "
countrie s are the ones that cannot meet these needs if part of their arable

-9land has to be diverted to produce other food and non-food cash crops.

Finally

"surplus" countries are the ones that meet their food as well other non-food
crop requirements.
It should be noted that the population carrying capacity reported in Table
2 for "limited" countries is the population that can be sustained if all arable
land was devoted to crop production and this exceeds their projected population
in year 2000.

However, if a third of all land is assumed to be devoted tooth

er crops and the carrying capacity correspondingly reduced by a third, the
projected population (by year 2000) of these countries will exceed the reduced
carrying capacity. This is why they are listed under the category "limited".
Since in many countries of the developing world population will still be grow
ing in year 2000, Shah et al (1984) compare population carrying capacity with
the hypothetical size of stationary population.

In this comparison, even with

a high level of technology eleven countries cannot support the size of their
stationary population, the most populous among them_ being Bangladesh which is
expected to reach a stationary population of 430 million in year 2035. Eight
countries can support their stationary population only at a high level of tech
nology, but of the most populous among them, namely Nigeria, the balance be
tween carrying capacity (701 million) and stationary population (623 million)
is too close for comfort.
Yet another study of this nature is attributed (with no source cited) to
Bernard Gilland (World Bank, 1984, p.91).

By multiplying an assumed maximum

yield of 5 tons of grain equivalent per hectare and an assumed (indefinitely
sustainable) availability of 1.5 billion hectares of land, a maximum global
output of 7.5 billion tons of grain equivalent is obtained.

Gilland's assump

tion that "a completely satisfactory" diet including some meat will involve an
average daily total intake (direct and indirect through livestock products) of

-109000 kilo calories per capita of "plant energy" leads him to conclude that the
earth can support 7.5 billion people.

A projected stationary population of

roughly 11.5 billion people can be supported at a consumption about 6000 kilo
calories per capita.
What inference can one draw from such studies?

It would appear that

there is technologica l capability and land resources to sustain a population of
as high as 33 billion (or nearly 9 times the projected population of 3.6
billion in year 2000) in the five regions of the world included in the
FAO-IIASA study.

But this by itself is no cause for complacency since there is

virtually no economic analysis underlying these projections even though their
data base and assumptions regarding technology are considerably more
sophisticate d and far more spatially disaggregate d than any of the earlier
studies of the same genre.

Since farming is done by millions of individual

peasants, unless it is in their private economic interest, given the prices for
inputs and outputs they face and the constraints to which they are subject,
they will not produce a particular set and levels of crop outputs merely
because it is agro-climat ically and technologica lly feasible to produce it.

In

particular the investments in land, capital equipment, livestock, technical
skills and knowledge needed to attain the potential output will not be
forthcoming unless the returns are adequate.

By asking whether each country or

region within a country has the potential to sustain its projected year 2000 or
its stationary population, one completely ignores the economic cost of such
autarkic development even if it were feasible to do so. Thus fundamental ideas

of comparative advantage and gains from trade between regions within a country
and between countries are conspicuous by their absence in such analyses.

At

best these studies are useful in pinpointing countries where with a technology
which raises the output per unit of land to the fullest extent, even current
level of population cannot be sustained relying solely on home production. This
may be taken as indicating the need for out-migratio n of
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a part of its population or for investment in production for exports to pay for
food imports or some combination of both.
3.

FAO's Agriculture Toward 2000
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) published its projections for

the year 2000 in its publication Agriculture: Toward 2000 (FAO, 1981).

This

study individually covered 90 developing countries, accounting for 98% develop
ing country population outside of China and summarily covered 34 developed
countries.

Its purpose was to project and analyze the implications for agri

culture of three major scenarios:

A trend scenario representing a continuation

of the trends since the early 1960's, a modest improvement over these trends
(Scenario B) and a more ambitious (Scenario A) and still deemed feasible rate
of growth.

The agronomic and technical bases for the projections are perhaps

stronger than their economic basis. The presence of the latter is however an
improvement over its virtual absence in studies of
capacity.

population carrying

On the other hand, while the study emphasizes that access to produc~

tive assets, particularly land and other critical inputs including credit, has
to be widely shared for successful agricultural development, by not addressing
the existing distortions, it implicitly assumes that they will continue. The
medium variant of the UN population projections is common to all scenarios. The
demand for agricultural products is mostly driven by exogenously specified
income and population trends of each scenario, except that caloric intake per
capita is not allowed to fall in countries with declining trends and not

allowed to exceed certain upper bounds in countries with

rising trends.

Production estimates were based on projections of land and water resources,
investment and optimistic (though deemed reasonable) increases in yield per
hectare of land.
The results are given in Table 3.

The study concludes that doubling of

agricultural production in 20 years in the ambitious Scenario A (and an 80%

-12increase in the less ambitious Scenario B) depends on a tremendous transforms
tion of agriculture in all developing countries that is no less than:-" almost
an agricultural revolution, involving widespread modernization in technology
and techniques, and based primarily on a massive increase in imputs into agri
culture (well over doubling annual investment and no less than tripling current
inputs alone in Scenario A).

The overall development strategy thus relies

heavily on rapid increases in current inputs, backed by a steady expansion of
relatively high cost investment with longer gestation periods, and pursued with
an increased awareness of the need to conserve the environment and avoid un
desirable social consequences

11

(FAO (1981), p. 57).

Yet even if this ambi

tious and challenging task is accomplished, the study concludes that 260 mil
lion (390 million in Scenario B) people in 86 of the 90 study countries consti
tuting 7% of their population, will be seriously undernourished in year 2000.
In three of the countries more than 15% of the population will be seriously
undernourished. However these estimates of undernourished population have to be
used with caution since the scientific basis of fixed energy requirements on

which they rely is under debate.
The FAO study briefly addresses the question whether a less rapid (or more
rapid) population growth compared to the growth rates assumed would materially

modify the results (FAO (1983, p. 42).

Depending on where the slowing down (or

speeding up) occurred, the results would be changed substantially - speeding up
of population growth in already poor countries with weak agricultural and eco
nomic growth prospects could be disastrous.

On

the other hand, a slowing down

of population growth may reduce the cereal import requirements of cereal

im

porting countries and the number of seriously undernourished in the population.
The study also attempts at a longer term projection up to year 2055.

With

population in the developing world (including China) increasing by more than

-1360% over its level in year 2000, agric ultura l produ ction
will have to be nearly
three times its 2000 level (or nearly five times its 1980
level ). Since only a
few count ries have reserv es of arable land and water , produ
ction increa se will
become geogr aphic ally more conce ntrate d and the impor tance
of intern ationa l
trade will be more signi fican t. Food impor ters will have
to rely on rapid
growt h of produ ction and expor ts of non-a gricu ltural produ
cts to financ e their
food impor ts. The study recog nizes {with out attem pting
to quant ify) the envi
ronme ntal impli cation s {part icular ly in terms of soil qualit
y and erosio n, and
water pollu tion, etc.) of the irriga tion - chemi cal fertil
izer- energy based
techno logy of the rapid expan sion of argric ultura l outpu
t.
The view is put
forwa rd that there is an intert empo ral trade -off betwee
n reduc tion of pover ty
of prese nt gener ation and the qualit y of the enviro nment
beque athed to future
gener ations in develo ping count ries and in this trade -off,
given the extrem e
pover ty in some count ries, the prese nt gener ation perhap
s should be favore d.

4. The Globa l 2000 Repor t
The Globa l 2000 Repor t {Coun cil on Enviro nment al Quali ty,
1981) to the
Presid ent of the USA {here after the Repor t) was prepar ed
follow ing the
Presi dent's 1977 Enviro nment al Message requir ing the Globa
l 2000 Study Group
"to develo p proje ction of trends in popul ation, resou rces,
and the enviro nment
for the entire World throug h the year 2000" (The Repor
t, Volume 2, p. 3). Each
partic ipatin g group , respo nsible for proje cting popul ation,
Gross Natio nal Pro
duct, Clima te and Techn ology was asked "to make proje ctions
using the proje c
tion tools it curre ntly employs in making long term projec
tion" (ibid ., p. 3).
The Repor t candi dly admits that "colle ctivel y, the execu
tive agenc ies of the
govern ment are curre ntly incapa ble of prese nting the Presid
ent with a mutua lly
consi stent set of proje ctions on world trend in popul ation,
resou rces, and the

-14environment.

While the projections presented (in The Report) •.• are probably

the most internally consistent ever developed with the long-range, global mod
els now used by the agencies, they are still plagued by inadequacies and in
The main reason for inconsistenc ies is that the

consistencie s" (ibid. p. S).

mutual feedback effects between population, resources and the environment are
not fully allowed for in the projections.

As the report puts it "In particu

lar, the population and GNP projections that are made in the first step -- {of
a three step process ending in environmenta l projections) are based largely on
extrapolatio ns of past trends and are uninformed by interactive feedback from
the resource and environment al projections" (ibid. p. 4).

This drawback has to

be kept in mind in interpreting the results.
The grain-oilsee d-livestock (GOL) submode! which forms the projection mod
el of The Report is an econometric model consisting of 930

equ<1t jc,M- f.ttr r ~,1 .7,

ing or describing the demand, supply and trade relating to gtc'<frf., c,51FH<' a<'
livestock.

The model covered the world in terms of 28 (14) countries or re
The exogenous variables include (regional) pop

gions regarding grains (meat).

ulation and income growth rates, variables describing agricultural and trade
policy as well as weather.

Endogenous variables include prices at which trade

takes place, supply, demand etc.

The supply equations reflect technology, that

is input-output relationship s, and producer behaviour. The full model consisted
of three submodels for projecting arable area, total food production and con
sumption, and fertilizer use.

Fertilizer was a proxy for a number of variables

relating to technology and its change, such as the adoption of improved crop
varieties, use of pesticides, extension of irrigation etc.

The arable area

submode! included an equation for each of 27 regions (28th. being the residual

region called the rest of the world) with reliable historical data defining
total arable area as a function of GOL and non-GOL product prices, a time trend

-15 and an esti mat e of maximum pot ent
ial ara ble are a. The pro duc tion
and consump
tion of non-GOL pro duc ts wer e pro
ject ed on the bas is of his tor ica
l rela tion 
ship s betw een GOL and non-GOL pro
duc ts. Con sist enc y che cks wer e
made by com
par ing the pro jec tion s of out put
of non-GOL pro duc ts aga ins t the
pro duc tion
cap aci ty ava ilab le for the ir pro
duc tion as imp lied by the ara ble
are a ava ilab le
for the ir cul tiva tion (i.e . tot
al ara ble are a min us the are a use
d up by GOL
pro duc ts) and the tren d gro wth
in non-GOL pro duc ts yie lds . Con
s~m ptio n pro jec 
tion s were che cke d aga ins t his tor
ic income and pric e rela tion shi
ps and cha nge s
in tas te. App aren tly the se che cks
pro ved sat isfa cto ry. The fer tili
zer use sub 
model con sist ed of reg ion -sp eci
fic equ atio ns rela ting fer tili zer
use to tot al
foo d pro duc tion bas ed on cro sssec tion al and tim e-s erie s inp ut-o
utp ut
rela tion shi ps.
The pur pos e of the GOL mod el was
to pro jec t wor ld pro duc tion , con
sum ptio n,
trad e and pric es of gra in, oils
eed , and live sto ck pro duc ts for
1995 and 200 0.
Wh ile the cov erag e is more ext ens
ive wit h res pec t to gra ins and
les s in resp ect
of live sto ck, the model is sti ll
imp ress ive in its com mod ity, reg
ion al and
pric e det ail. The model belo ngs
to the sta tic equ ilib rium gen re
and as suc h,
its pro jec tion s say for 199 5, is
ind epe nde nt of its pro jec tion s
for any oth er
yea r, say 200 0.
Fur the r, the cha nge s betw een any
two yea rs in var iab les tha t
are exo gen ous to the mod el, suc
h as pop ula tion , per cap ita inco
me etc . by def i
nit ion , not infl uen ced by the pro
jec tion s for the same two yea rs
of the end o
gen ous var iab les of the mod el.
The cru cia l assu mpt ion und erly ing
the pro jec tion s are : (1) No maj
or man
made or nat ura l sho cks wil l occ
ur. In par ticu lar no clim atic
cha nge is pro 
jec ted thou gh the sce nar ios inc
lud e "op tim isti c" and "pe ssim isti
c" wea ther as
sum ptio ns; (2) Yei lds per hec tare
of land wil l evo lve at rate s com
para ble to
the ir his tor ic evo luti on sinc e
195 0. (3) Pro tec tion ist agr icu
ltur al pol icie s

-16in Western Europe and political determination of US trade with China, Eastern
Europe and USSR will continue.

Three alternative scenarios are simulated:

Alternative I is the reference or baseline scenerio in which growth rates of
world population and per capita income assume their median values of 1.8% and
1.5% respectively between 1975 and 2000.
compared with to 1950-1975.

No change in weather is assumed as

Energy prices are assumed either to remain un

changed at their 1974-76 real levels or alternatively to reach more than twice
these levels by 2000.

Alternative II is the optimistic scenario with lower

population growth (1.5%) and higher per capita income growth (2.4%).

Weather

is assumed to be more favorable than during 1950-1975, thereby increasing
yields by one standard error above those under 1950-75 weather.
are kept unchanged relative to their 1974-76 real level.

Energy prices

Alternative III is

the pessimistic scenario with population growth high (2.1%), per capita income
growth low (0.7%) and unfavorable weather resulting in yields falling by one
standard error below those under 1950-75 weather.

Real petroleum prices more

than double in this Scenario relative to their 1974-76 values by year 2000.
The projections(Tables 4 and 5) show that even in the pessimistic third
alternative, consumption of food is higher by about 4% in year 2000 over its
1969~71 level, though grain consumption is lo~er by about 3% from its 1969-71
level of 311 kilograms per capita.

Under the base line Alternative I, per cap

ita food consumption in 2000 is higher compared to 1969-71 by 14.5% and 17.0%
respectively depending on whether real energy prices
1974-76 and 2000 or stay constant.

more than double between

Grain consumption is higher by 10.3% and

13.2% respectively under the same circumstances.

Though the per capita caloric

consumption in 2000 in less developed countries as a whole remains unchanged at
its 1969-71 level of 2165 kilocalories per day under the pessimistic third al
ternative and increases by 7.6% to 9.5% under the baseline alternative depend-

-17ing on the trend on petroleum prices, there are enormous regional variations .
The sub-sahara n African countries appear to fare the worst: even in the opti
mistic third alternativ e their per capita food consumptio n in year 2000 is low
er by 13.7% compared to its 1969-71 level and by a larger 18.7%-19.1% range
under the baseline alternativ e.

Daily caloric intake falls from

level of 2139 to 1920 in the optimistic scenerio.
quirements are essentiall y

its 1969-71

Though average calorie re

meaningle ss, for the record the FAO-WHO require

ments for developing Africa is 2325.

In South Asia and North Africa only the

pessimist ic scenario leads to a fall in food consumptio n per capita by 3.6% and
1.6% respective ly in 2000 compared to 1969-71.

Thus it would appear that ex

cept for Subsaharan Africa, the world has the physical and economic capacity to
produce enough food to meet modest increases in demand through 2000.
The Report points out that the ability to sustain this modest increase
arises from substanti al increases in the resources committed to food production
and impressive increases in gains in resource- productiv ity through wider adop
tion of improved technology and the use of land augmenting inputs such as fer
tilizers and pesticide s.

In fact, even though arable land per capita declines

from an average 0.39 hectares in 1971-75 to 0.25 by year 2000 (which happens to
equal that projected by FAO for 90 developing countries , see Table 3) in the
reference alternativ e, because the use of fertilizer s nearly tripled from 55
kilograms in 1971-75 per hectare to 145 kilograms in year 2000, food production
roughly doubles over the same period.

Achieving such an intensific ation in

input usage is expensive besides being a formidable task.

This is because in

creasing fertilizer use depends to a significan t extent on irrigation , and cre
ating irrigation capacity is likely to be capital intensive. Operating the ca
pacity created and producing the fertilizer s needed are both energy-in tensive.
Further managing irrigation systems efficientl y is skill intensive.

-18Since at the regional (and a fortiori at the level of a country) level
supplies and demands do not balance, there is a substantial increase in inter
national trade.

The extent of the increase by year 2000 varies from 63% to

110% over the 1973-75 level among alternatives.

This implies that food import

ing countries would have to export other commodities to finance such massive
increases in their food imports.

Since developing country food importers ac

count for 36% - 43% of world imports in the year 2000, the financing problem is
indeed a serious one. Apart from the problem of generating exportable sur
pluses, the task of converting them into export earnings is likely to prove
daunting if the protectionist trends in the developed world intensifies.

Be

sides the assumptions that political determination of U.S. grain trade and ag

ricultural protectionism of Western Europe will continue may be realistic, but
it would be naive to pretend that they have no serious consequences.
The Report was primarily addressed to assessing the environmental impact
of global population and income trends.

In its discussion of very long term

effects on climate, the Report confines itself to indicating possible frequen
cies of extremes such as severe droughts (in those areas of the world prone to
such events) if global warming or cooling were to take place.

However it did

not relate trends in population income, industrializatio n etc. to the probabil
ity of long term cooling or warming.

The Report recognizes that the effort to

increase food output through expansion of arable area, extension of irrigation,
use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides will have an impact on the environ
ment particularly in terms of deforestation,

desertification , soil degrada

tion, (increasing salinity and erosion) chemical pollution of surface and
ground waters, etc.
are manageable.

It concludes however that these problems though serious
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5.

The System of Models of Internat ional Institut e for Applied Systems

Analysis (IIASA)
Unlike the static partial equilibri um GOL model of the Global 2000 Report,
the IIASA System of medels is of the dynamic general equilibri um genre. It con
sists of a set of country models some of which were put together by research
groups within each country with a substan tial degree of disaggre gation and oth
ers built by the research team of the Ford and Agricult ure Project (FAP) of
IIASA).

The country models were designed in such a way that they could be ag

gregated to a common ten sector model, distingis hing nine agricult ure and live
stock product sectors (Wheat, Rice, Coarse grains, Bovine and ovine meats,
dairy products , other animal products , Protein Fuels, other food, non-food

Agricul tural Products ) and a single sector covering all non-agg ricultura l
activiti es.

The aggregat ed country models (22 in all of which 19 are models

for individu al countrie s and 3 are for country groups consistin g of the Europe
an Community (EC), The Eastern European group includin g USSR called Council on
Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) and a rest of the world residual group) were linked
in a global trading system called the Basic Linked System (see Parikh and Rabar
(1981) for details) .
Briefly stated, each aggregat ed model consists of a supply module and de
mand module.

The supply module determin es the producti on decision s in each

year on the basis of expected prices which are assumed to be a function of.£.!!!.::_
rent prices (and past prices in some models) the emerging outputs being avail
able for sale in the next year.

The output vector thus generate d represen t

claims to income and agents decide on the disposit ion of income into consump
tion, savings and investme nt.

The differen ce between producti on and domestic

use determin es the net foreign trade vector of each country.

To the extent a

country receives or makes internat ional transfer s, income and domestic expendi
ture will differ by the extent of the transfer .

Equivale ntly the transfer al
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lows a country to run a net deficit on its external trade equaling the value of
the transfer at the prices at which trade takes place.

In some country models

several groups of agents (rural, urban, income classes etc.) are distinguished,
:

each group being endowed with its own preferences and claims to output. Several
government policies are modeled: tariffs which establish a wedge between domes
tic and international prices, export and import quotas, buffer stock opera
tions, domestic rationing and public food procurement and distribution systems,
income transfers between agents etc.
The system is solved as follows:

For any year of simulation, the output

available for exchange is predetermined by producer decisions of the previous
year.

With this output vector, given an exogenously specified value of trade

deficit, and specified government policies, each country's demand vector and
hence its net import vector corresponding to any given international price vec
tor can be determined.

If the sum of the net import vectors over all the coun

tries is zero, then the given international price vector is an equilibrium
vector.

If not, the price vector is changed according to some well specified

· rule and the process i.s repeated until international equilibrium is achieved.
Once the equilibrium price vector is determined, the associated domestic price
vector determines the output vector for the next year either through a simple
static price expectations mechanism or through more complicated distriuted lags
set up involving past domestic prices as well.

The output response to the ex

pected prices is influenced also by the investment in production capacity made
in the previous year, the investment demand in equilibrium being part of the
aggregate demand vector for that-year.
year of a sequence of years.

Thus the model can be solved for each

The data base of the model included FA0's supply

utilisation accounts for about 1000 commodities for the period 1961-1976, which
were aggregated to suit the sectoral classification of the model.

The model
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served prices, outputs and trade flows of the period 1970-1976 as closely as
possible. Then the model was run in a simulation mode for the period 1977-2000.
For each country the model can be run in a stand-alone mode in which the time
path of the international prices relevant for its foreign trade is exogenously
specified or in a linked mode when it is solved as part of the Basic Linked
System (BLS) in which the path of the international price vector is itself file.
dogenously determined so as to clear international commodity market along the
lines described above.

It should also be mentioned that even though population

growth was exogenously specified in all models, in some labour force

partici

pation rates and rural-urban migration was endogenised through simple income
related behavioral equations.
The results are shown in Table 6.

Even though the methodology of IIASA

models is different from and many ways superior to that of The Report the re
sults are broadly similar.

While The Report projects a global population for

year 2000 varying from 5921 millions in Alternative II to 6797 million in Al
ternative III with a figure of 6351 million for the reference Alternative I,

IIASA projects a figure of 6106 millions for its reference run.

The GNP growth

rates in the IIASA model are endogenous while they are exogenous in The Report
with the IIASA growth rates being somewhat higher.

The output of all grains in

the year 2000 for the IIASA model is 1959 million tonnes as compared to the
range of 2120 to 2233 million tonnes in The Report.

Total exports of grain in

year 2000 is of the order of 152 million tons in the IIASA model while it rang

es between 178 to 239 million tons in the report.

It is understandable that

the volume of trade is higher in The Report than in the IIASA projections. The
reason is that The Report model

of the static partial equilibrium kind limits

the extent of adjustment to changing prices.

Since the country groupings in

-22the two models are different, a direct comparison of results may not be
Still it would appear that if we use caloric intake as an indica

appropriate.

tor of welfare, the prospects for the developing countries as a whole are some
what better in the IIASA projections then in those of The Report.
The India model of IIASA system is more elaborate than others in that it
distinguishe s five income (more precisely, per capita real consumption expendi
ture) groups among rural and urban populations with the groups numbered accord
ing to increasing affluence (i.e. group 1 is the poorest and group 5 is the
richest in both rural and urban areas).

Each group has its own demand function

represented by a Stone-Geary linear expenditure system and the distribution of
aggregate consumer expenditure among groups is assumed to be log-normal.

In

this model population growth is exogenously specified and influences only the
demand module.

Three alternative growth paths were specified:

Alternative 1

corresponds to IIASA's reference projection, Alternative 2 corresponds to the
standard projections for year 2000 and Alternative 3 corresponds to the rapid
fertility decline and standard mortality decline projection of the world bank
(1984). There is a difference of 121 million between the projections of Alter
native 1 and 3 by year 2000. The model was run in a standalone mode with the
time path of the internationa l price vector faced by India exogenously speci
fied to be the same as that emerging as the equilibrium path in the Linked ref
erence run.

For the reason that population influences only per capita income

and demand and not the production process, the differences between the alterna
tives are not large (See Table 7). As is to be expected, Alternative 3 with the
slowest population growth leads to a minuscule speeding up in the rate of
growth of real GDP. However, the impact on caloric intake and on the distribu
tion of population among expenditure groups is more perceptible.

In general

for all groups caloric intake increases as population growth decreases and the
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to richer expenditure classes, particularly in the urban areas.
The IIASA system of models include an environment module for studying in
teractions between agriculture and the environment.

However this part of

IIASA's modeling effort was to rely heavily on modelling by others outside
IIASA. Few results are available to review them here.

6.

·Other Projections
Ever since the Club of Rome sponsored global systems modeling in the early

1970's several models have been published (see Glenn Fox and Vernon

Ruttan

(1983) for a brief discussion of some of the models) in which the interaction
of the processes of population growth, incme growth and exhaustible resource
depletion is explored with a view to identifying and characterizing a global
equilibrium state that is indefinitely sustainable if one existed.

Early mod

els such as those of Forrester (1971) and Meadows et al (1972) were mechanical
simulations of the consequences of their assumptions: their equations of motion
had no empirical basis and the processes describing behavior were devoid of
economic content. Though subsequent models have remedied some of these defects
and in particular introduced economic processes, they have not been notable for
the soundness of the empirical econometric basis of the myriad relationships
included in them.

The projection from such models are of limited use if not

altogether meaningless and not reported here.
Among models which have food and agriculture as their primary concern,
the model of International Relations in Agriculture (MOIRA) (Linnemann et al
1979) which is a precursor of the IIASA system of models is notable for its
attempt to incorporate behavioral economics into the analysis, with sectoral
value added maximization by producers given input prices and with resources and
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rate demand functions for each of 12 income classes. MOIRA describes food sec
tors of individual countries and links these sectors by means of an equilibrium
model of international trade.
1965.

All national models have the same base year

The projections of MOIRA are couched in terms of "consumable protein"

and as such are not directly comparable with those of other models as base. For
ease of comparison, the projections have been converted into indexes with 1980.
Two alternative income growth (high and moderate) scenarios are presented (See
Table 8). These scenarios assume no change in policies relating to tariffs and

quotas, and domestic policies relating to rural/urban income parity targets
etc.

Two variants relating rate of growth of non-agricultural GDP (a crucial

variable which is exogenous) were used.

In the Scenario with relatively high

growth rates, the average growth rates by year in percentage terms were:
Developing

Developed

World

Centrally
Planned

1975-1985

7.6

4.5

6.5

5.0

1985-1995

7.1

4.2

6.4

4.8

1995-2005

6.8

3.• 8

5.8

4.5

In the relatively low growth rate Scenario these were halved.

Similarly

population growth rates were halved compared to the standard run in a low popu
lation growth variant.
Keeping population growth unchanged, lowering income growth rates lowers

per capita income growth and hence shifts demand downwards.

This results in

lower food production and consumption, the effects being more significant for
the developing countries.

In Tropical Africa and South Asia food consumption

per head in year 2000 goes down by 4% and 23% respectively relative to their

-251980 values in the low income growth variant as contrasted with increases of
48% and 4% in the high income growth variant, though the dramatic change in the
case of Tropical Africa appears somewhat peculiar.

Keeping income growth at

its high value but halving population growth increases per capita income growth
and per capita demand.

On the other hand, a lower population means lower la

bour availability for agricultural production.

Since higher per capita demand

is moderated by the lower absolute level of population, the net effect on total
demand given less than unitary income elasticity of demand, is downward. This
results in lower total output and lower food prices compared to standard popu
lation growth run, but in higher per capita comsumption of food everywhere ex
cept Southern Asia where per capita consumption is lower in the low population
growth run.

The reason for this peculiarity is stated to be that domestic food

prices have to be raised substantially (compared to high population growth run)
to maintain rural/urban income parity (Linnemann et al (1979), p.298).
The last two sets of projections to be briefly noted here were published
by the Resources for the Future, Inc.(Resources, Spring 1984) and International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, 1977). The basic underlying assumptions
of the former were that population would grow at an average rate of 1.75% per
year during 1980-90 slowing down to 1,65% during 1990-95. Ninety-three percent
of this growth would be in the less developed countries.
would be 6.16 billion in year 2000.

The world population

Per capita real GNP would grow at an aver

age rate of 3.5% per year during 1980-2000 with the highest growth rate of 5,6%
occurring in East Asia, with the European Economic Community (2.5%) and Sub
Saheran Africa (2.6%-3.2%) and Eastern Europe (3.1%) being at the lower end.
Given these assumptions as well as assumed demand elasticities projections were
made.

They show that world production of cereal grows at a rate of 1.83% per

year during 1980-200, with the EEC (1.12%) Sub-Saharan Africa (1.70%), Eastern
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(1.35%) growing more slowly than the rest of the world.

World trade grows sub

stantially with net imports of cereals rising from 131 million tons in 1978-80
to 242 million tons in 2000.

Meat imports triple from 2.6 million tons to 7.4

million tons during the same period.

The study concludes that "The World pos

sesses the potential to feed a growing population of 6.1 milion people moder
ately better than it fed 4.3 billion in 1980" (Resources, Spring 1984, p.19),
Per capita consumption of cereals increases from 361 kgs. in 1978-80 to 372
kgs. in 2000, with meat consumption rising from 32 kgs to 37 kgs.
IFPRI (1977) study is devoted to an assessment of food needs of developing
countries by the year 1990.

The methodology used is very simple, even simplis

tic: production was projected to 1990 by extending the 1960-75 trend.

Consump

tion targets for 1990 were derived from alternative ways: (1) average per cap
ita food consumption of 1975 is to be provided to the 1990 population (2) given
a set of income elasticities based on FAO studies, the demand arising from a
low (2a) and a high income growth (2b) Scenarios were set as targets and fi
nally, (3) food needs to meet 110 percent of FAO-WHO daily minimum per capita
food energy requirements were set as targets.
based on World Bank projections.

Income growth assumptions were

The medium variant of population projections

of the United Nations was used as reference in all scenarios while the low var
iant (2al and 2bl) was used as well in the two alternative income growth
scenarios. In all eighty-four developing market economies were included.
projections are reproduced in Table 9.

The

These appear to fall within the range

of the other projections reviewed earlier.

In the low variant of population

growth the food deficit of low income importing countries is somewhat less than
in the medium variant and that of others margionally less. Since population
growth affects the two IFPRI projections being compared (2a and 2al, 2b and

-272bl) only through demand effects arising from the implied changes in per capita
income, the relatively small difference observed between low and medium vari
ants of population growth is not surprising.

7.

The Neglected Effects
In all the projections reviewed above population growth was exogenous. Be

sides the effect, if any. of exogenous population growth on the environment
through desertificat ion and soil erosion and the associated consequences on
climate in general, and frequency of severe droughts and floods in particular,
and on farm size and increasing fragmentatio n of holdings due to subdivisions
of land within families, and the impact of these on agricultural output were
either completely ignored or treated outside the framework of projections.
Writers such as Lester Brown and his colleagues at the World Watch Institute
argue that "as world population expands, the shrinking cropland area per person
and the reduction in average soil depth by erosion combine to steadily reduce
the per capita availability of topsoil for food production.

If between 1980

and 2000 there is a 6 per cent net increase in cultivated land area and a con
tinuation of recent soil erosion rates, the amount of top soil per person will
fall from 792 tons to 489 tons by the end of the century, a decline of 38 per
cent" (Brown et al (1984), ch. 10, p.189). They conclude that "achieving a
more satisfactory balance between the world demand and supply of food requires
attention in both sides of the equation.

On

the demand side, the success of

efforts to upgrade diets may depend on an emergency program to slow population
growth---On the supply side, the scarcity of new cropland, the continuing loss
of top soil, the scarcity of fresh water, and diminishing returns on chemical
fertilizer combine to make expanding food production progressivel y more diffi
cult (ibid. p. 190-191).

After pointing out that the factors that make expand-
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ing food supplies difficult in a technical sense do not make it impossible but
only make it progressively costly relative to real incomes (particularly of the
poor), they conclude that ''nothing less than a wholesale reexamination and re
ordering of social and economic priorities - giving agriculture and family
planning the emphasis they deserve - will get the world back on an economic and
demographic path that will reduce hunger (rather) than increase it" (ibid,

p.193).
Apart from the doubtful empirical support for estimates of global soil
erosion and degradation, the above formulation of the impact of population
growth understates (in fact it ignores) the response of private agents to mar
ket signals as well as social action that can prevent a situation as grim as
the one portrayed from arising. As Kelley (1984) points out essentially there
are only two prima facie plausible arguments that can be advanced in support of
the hypothesis that rapid population growth will necessarily lead to disaster.
First, rapid population growth by extending cultivation to marginal lands and
intensive cultivation in intra-marginal lands will lead to a progressively in
creasing relative price of food because of diminishing returns to factors other
than land. Implicit in this argument are the beliefs that (a) reserves of ar
able land are nearly exhausted (b) technical change that can mitigate diminish
ing returns will not occur (c) the benign feed-back effect of rising incomes on
the rate of natural increase in population, if there is any, will be too slow
acting relative to the malign effect of rising cost of food on the health and
nutritional status of the poorer groups in the population.

The second argument

rests on the belief that natural resources (including the environment) are ex
haustible in the sense that real marginal costs of extraction will eventually
rise steeply and the exploitation of possibilities of substitution (of rela
tively abundant natural resources and/or primary factors such as capital and
labour for scarce resources) are either limited or prohibitively costly.

-29Simon (1981) has persua sively argued that empiri cal suppor t for
these as
sertio ns is almost non-ex istent. In his view availa ble data sugges
t that the
real cost of food (as well as many other natura l resour ces) has
been falling
instea d of rising .

It would appear that there are still reserv es of unutil ized

arable land in some areas of the world (partic ularly in south Americ
a) and in
any case the possib ilities of increa sing the effect ive availa bility
of land by
increa sing croppi ng intens ity (i.e. throug h multip le croppi ng)
are far from
exhaus ted. The potent ial for raisin g output in many parts of the
develo ping
world throug h adopti on of known superi or techno logy is yet to be
realize d in
full measur e. Beside s the theory of and empiri cal eviden ce for
induce d innova 
tion (Rutta n and Hayami (1984) , Hayami and Kikuch i (1981) ) sugges
t that the
proces s of techni cal and institu tional change themse lves will be
respon sive to
emergi ng scarci ties. In any case, the fact that the relativ e price
of food and
many natura l resour ces have not risen and in many cases have fallen
sugges ts
that the bear of dimini shing return s and the bogey of resour ce
deplet ion have
so far been kept at bay! The extern ality aspect s of enviro nmenta
l degrad ation
and institu tions to intern alize its costs (eithe r throug h market
interv ention
in the form of taxes and subsid es or assignm ent of "prope rty rights
" are well
known. One intere sting issue is whethe r the appare ntly more seriou
s enviro n
mental effect s are more relate d to income levels and their growth
than to popu
lation growth in and of itself .
Some, even among those who do not forsee a rapid popula tion growth
as a
problem in the long run, would still recogn ize that there may be
an "adjus t
ment" problem in the short and medium run. Ruling out "adjus tment"
throug h
Malthu sian "natur al checks " or throug h dracon ian and coerci ve contro
ls over
child bearin g decisio ns of couple s such as the Chines e one child
per family
policy from consid eration , the problem can be define d as follow
s. Even though
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the long run sustaina ble (i.e. steady state) level of populati on may be sub
stantial ly larger than the current level and the level of living associat ed
with the long run steady state may also be much better, it is possible that (in

the absence of non-coer cive policy instrume nts that influenc e populati on
growth) there may be no feasible path that would take the society from its ini

tial position to the steady state. Indeed the argument (it is just that with no
strong econome tric support) that rapid populati on growth reduces savings and
investme nt at least in the short and medium run would suggest that the achieve
ment of a steady state could be delayed, if not preclude d altogeth er.

However

a more serious problem in many developi ng countrie s is that inapprop riate pub
lic policy interven tions have blunted and distorte d the incentiv es of farmers
to enlarge food supplies .

Even in countrie s where substan tial investme nt in

irrigatio n works, developm ent of location specific agricult ural technolo gy in
cluding superior crop varietie s, diffusio n of such technolo gy through extensio n
and subsidiz ed credit etc. have been part of public policy, still the design of
these policies and the management of the facilitie s created have been so poor
and leakages endemic as to reduce their benefits and to distort their
distribu tion among socio-eco nomic groups in the rural populati on.
contrast ed

As

with the empirica l support for many of the argument s about the del

eterious conseque nces of rapid populati on growth, the empirica l evidence on the
cost of ill conceive d public policy interven tions in agricult ure in developi ng
countrie s in Africa, Asia and Latin America is strong and well documen ted.
8.

Conclusi ons
It would appear from the projecti ons of various models reviewed earlier

that the demand for food likely to arise from anticipa ted income and populati on
growth can be met.
reasons.

However this conclusi on has to be qualifie d for several

Even though alternat ive income and populati on growth scenario s are
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endogenous and only in the IIASA model income growth is endogenous.

Endogeniz

ing population growth is very likely to increase the chances of long run via
bility of the system.

Adjustment to incipient excess demands or supplies of

goods and factors through relative price changes, at a point in time and over
time, within countries and in the international market is exploited to the
greatest extent in the IIASA system of models but to lesser and varying degrees
in other models.
at all.

The process of technical change is very crudely modeled, if

In particular it is independent of population growth so that the pos

sibility that the rate of technical progress is augmented by population growth
a la Simon and Steinman (1981) is ruled out.

Except the IIASA system and the

MOIRA models, all others are static but even in the former the modeling of the
process of investment in capacity creation

appears to be rudimentary and

future returns from investing in alternative activities do not appear to
influence the pattern of investment.
Several possible channels of influence of population growth on the produc
tion capacity of the economy in general and food and agriculture in particular
were mentioned above.

Not all of which have been nor can be explicity taken

into account in the projections reviewed.

One of the more important among

these is the process of shift of labour away from agriculture resulting in a
declining proportion of labour force employed in agriculture in the course of
development.

In most of the presently developed countries this proportion is

less than 10% and in some of the developing countries it has fallen substan
tially in the post second world war era.

Yet in India it bas hardly changed in

over a hundred years from about 70%, even though the share of agriculture in
gross domestic product bas steeply declined.
better.

The situation in Bangladesh is no

The proportion of labor force employed in agriculture in China is only

-32marginally less than that of India's according to the World Bank (1984, Table
21, p.258).

If a virtually unchanging proportion of a rapidly growing (because

of population growth) labour force is employed in agriculture while at the same
time the share of domestic products originating in agriculture falls, in the
absence of massive transfers income disparities between agricultural and non
agricultural workers will widen. But the failure to reduce the pressure on ag
riculture would seem to emerge, not from rapid population growth .rurr_ se but
from the strategy of industrialization that increasesd capital intensity of
production outside agriculture thereby_ limiting the scope of expanding non
agricultural employment. In MOIRA and some of the IIASA country models (India
model is not one of them) income parity between these two groups is included as
a policy target, though the relationship between the target and the policy in
struments which can help achieve it is not transparent.
It was mentioned earlier that the pattern of landholdings (in terms of
size distribution of farms), land tenure and other contractual arrangements in
agriculture may be influenced by population growth and technical changes.

Such

institutional changes may in turn affect distribution of real incomes (or in
come entitlements,_as Sen (1981) would put it) and access to food.

Incorporat

ing these into the formal methodology of projections is not simple, if not for
any other reason, for the reason that even the theory endogenesing institu
tional change is in its infancy.

Yet these changes could be far more signifi

cant than those included in the projection models.
A discussion of issues relating to famines and other such disasters has
been deliberately kept out of the paper for several reasons. Such episodes are
occasional and infrequent, if they are distinguished from "normal" fluctuations
in output from its longrun trend.

And disaster relief from national and inter

national sources is often available if famine threatens.

Normal fluctuations

-33whether they relate to output or to terms of trade have to be addresse d by oth
er means and populati on growth has little to do with them.

Further, the fact

that enough food is availabl e to feed the entire populati on of a country is no
guarante e that no one will starve.

Equally, the fact that not enough food is

availabl e to prevent starvati on of everyone does not mean that everyone will
indeed share in the starvati on.

How the availabl e food is distribu ted among

the populati on will depend on the instituti onal arrangem ents relating to pro
duction and exchange (for instance , in a market economy an individu al has to
have enough purchasi ng power through his "income entitlem ents" to be able to
afford a diet above starvati on level!) includin g in particul ar the nature of
transpor tation, storage and distribu tion net works.

As recent tragic events in

Ethiopia show, that in the absence of such a network the food shipped by the
rest of the world will not reach the starving in time.

These elementa ry and

fairly obvious relation ships between instituti ons and access to food and their
implicat ions for understa nding episodes of famine are elegantl y elaborat ed in
Sen (1981).

It would appear from his analysis of famines in pre-part ition Ben

gal in India in 1943, Banglade sh, in the Wollo region of Ethiopia and in Sahel
the early seventie s as well as the famine deaths exceedin g a staggerin g 16 mil
lion in China in the early sixties that their main cause was not shortage of
food or rapid populati on growth but colossal policy failures in areas unrelate d
to populati on growth.
Once again with famine raging in Ethiopia currentl y, some continue to
assert that, even though successi ve droughts are contribu tory causes, rapid
populati on growth and its alleged conseque nces (of desertif ication, abandonm ent
of traditio nal methods of cultivat ion in favour of others which were ecologi
cally damaging etc.) are behind the tragedy and desertif ication may even be
responsi ble for the droughts .

However as in earlier episodes , policy failures

-34particul arly in distortin g incentiv es, may have more to do with the tragedy
than slower acting long term ecologic al processe s.

Comparison of recent expe

rience of Tanzania and Zimbabwe in coping with drought indeed suggests that
Tanzania n policies contribu ted signific antly to its relative lack of success.
The cause of eliminat ing starvati on and hunger in the world will be ill served
if instead of analyzin g avoidabl e policy failures in not providin g an
environm ent in which incentiv es to innovate and produce are not blunted (an
analysis that can be rooted in a firm empirica l base), one chases an alleged
deleteri ous relation ship between rapid populati on growth and the food economy
for which empirica l support is at best shaky.

Even if such support were

stronger , the pay-off to correcti ng policy failures is likely to be greater,
quicker and surer than attempts to change an admitted ly slow-act ing process of
interact ion between populati on growth and the food economy.

This is an

inescapa ble conclusi on that can be drawn from the remarkab le rebound from what
many then viewed as a crisis (whether correctl y or not) in the world food
economy in 1974.

Since then world food producti on bas increase d by 30%

outstrip ping populati on growth.

Mr. M. J. Williams the executiv e director of

World Food Council, establish ed by the World Food Conferen ce which met in 1974
is quoted recently as saying that "After 10 years, it's quite clear that
globally the world can produce enough food to feed all its populati on.

And

that assumes a yearly increase in that populati on" (New York Times, December 2,
1984).

The only exceptio n to this encourag ing picture is Africa.

Accordin g,

to the same report Mr. Williams attribut ed only a small part of Africa's food
problems to drought and a larger part to the failure of many African
governm ents to develop farm programmes that would provide incentiv es to small
farmers.
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-37Table 1
Population Projection s (Millions)

Rapid Fertility Rapid Fertility &
Decline
Mortality Decline

Standard Projection
Country Grouping/Y ear
I.

II.

Mid 1982

2000

2050

2000

2050

2000

2050

Low Income
Countries
of which China
India
Bangladesh
Pakistan

2276
1008
717
93
87

3107
1196
994
157
140

5092
1450
1513
357
302

2917
1196
927
136
120

4021
1450
1313
212
181

2931
1185
938
139
122

4225

Middle Income
Country
of which Indonesia
Nigeria
Brazil
Mexico

1120
153
91
127
73

1695
212
169
181
109

3144
330
471
279
182

1542
197
143
168
101

2321
285
243
239
155

1556
198
147
169
101

2437
298

17

33

77

30

46

30

49

723

780

232
118

259
128

384
270

431
306

4520

6046

III. High Income
Oil Exporting Countries

IV. Industria l Market
Economics
of which U.S.A.
Japan

v. Eastern European
Non-Marke t Economies
of which USSR

VI. Tota1 1

!Excludes countries with population less than 1 million.
Source: World Bank (1984).

1462
1406
230

197

265
247
160
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Population Carrying Capacities (Million)

Level of Farming Technology
Region

I.

Africa

Number of Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries
Po:12ulation Carriing Ca:12acitI of:
Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries
All Cotmtries

Low

29'
4
18

High

Intermediate

4
4
43

12
7
32

209 (466)
68 (62)
977 (252)

62 (110)
340 (258)
4087 (412)

9 (11)
70 (52)
12789 (717)

1254 (780)

4489 (780)

12868 (780)

II. Southwest Asia

Number of:Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries
Po:12ulation Carrying Capacity of:
Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Sur:12lus Countries
All Countries

14
1

Po:12ulation Carriing Ca:12acitI of:
.Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Sur:12lus Countries
All Countries

11

3
1

1

87 (195)
93 (69)

116 (195)
121 (69)

47 (89)
ll8 (106)
159 (69)

180 (264)

237 (264)

324 (264)

III. Southeast Asia

Number of Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Sur:12lus Countries

14

6
4
6

1

2

1

14

14

270 (341)
1492 (1190)
702 (407)

4210 (1782)

(3)
185 (153)
6149 (1782)

2464 (1938)

4358 (1938)

6334 (1938)

148

056)

-39Table 2 (continued)
Region

IV. Central America
Number of Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries

Level of Farming Technology
Intermediate

Low

14
2
5

High

7

2
1
18

14

Population Carrying Capacity of:
Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries

34 (52)
194 (139)
64 (24)

540 (191)

1281 (203)

All Countries

292 (215)

557 (215)

1293 (215)

V. South America
Number of Surplus Countries
Population Carrying Capacity of:
Surplus Countries

VI. All Regions
Number of Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries

13
1418 (393)

63
11

42

17

(24)

1
11

13
5288 (393)

(2)
(IO)

13
12375 (393)

35
7
74

18
9
89

Population Carrying Capacity of:
Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries

600 (1054)
1847 (1460)
3161 (1076)

343 (485)
340 (258)
14246 (2847)

57 (105)
384 (321)
32753 (3164)

All Countries

5603 (3590)

14928 (3590)

33194 (3590)

Note: Figures in parentheses denote the projected population by year 2000.
Source: M.M Shah et al (1984); Tables 14-18.
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Agriculture:

I.

Toward 2000:
1980

1990

2000

2259

2906

3630

993

1121

1244

Population (millions)
1.

90 developing countries

(included in the study)
-2.

Other developing countries
(including China)

II.

Projection

3.

Developed countries

1163

1248

1325

4.

World

4415

5275

6199

90 Developing countries

2.5

2.3

Other developing countries

1.2

1.0

Developed countries

0.7

0.6

World

1.6

1.7

Population Growth Rates*

(% per year)

III.

GDP Grovt.h Rate(% per year)**
90 Developing countries
Scenario A

6.8

7.2

Scenario B

5.6

5.8

Scenario A

3.7

3.1

Scenario B

3.8

3.2

Developed countries

-41Table 3 (continued)
Agriculture:

Toward 2000:
1980

IV.

Projection
1990

2000

Continuation of trends

2330

2370

Scenario A

2445

2635

Scenario B

2380

2500

3415

3475

Continuation of trends

518

636

Scenario A

569

786

Scenario B

538

696

Caloric intake Eer ca2ita
(kilo cals per day)
90 Developing countries

Developed countries

v.

2180

3315

Production of cereals
(million tons)
90 Developing countries

Developed countries

382*

818*

Continuation of trends

1102

Scenario A

1017

Scenario B

1069

VI. Net trade in cereals (million tons)

90 Developing countries

-36*

Continuation of trends

-72

-132

Scenario A

-57

-64

Scenario B

-67

-105

Scenario A

-15

-17

Scenario B

-19

-27

Other developing countries
(including China)

-16

-42Table 3 (continued)
Agriculture:

Toward 2000:

Projection

1990

2000

Scenario A

-72

-81

Scenario

-86

-132

0.29

0.25

1980
All Developing Countries

-52

B

VII. Available Land (hectares per capita)

90 Developing countries

*
**

Average for 1976-79

The first and second columns refer respectively to average annual

growth rates during 1980-90 and 1990-2000

Source FAO (1981), Statistical Annex Tables 3 and 5.
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Food Production. Consumption
and Trade and Price in 2000

I.

Industrialized Countries

Alternative I

Population Growth Rate(% per year)
Per capita Income Growth Rate(% per year)
Grain Production (Million Metric Tons)
Grain Consumption (Million Metric Tons)
Grain Trade (Million Metric Tons)
Food Production Index (1969-71=100)
Food Consumption Index (1969-71=100)
II.

0.52
2.57
739.7-679.1
648.1-610.8
+91.3-+68.3
157.0-143.7
155.8-147.7

0.34
3.35
730.0
689.6
+42.4
157 .1
165.7

0.71
1.77
683.3
590.2
+93.1
143.5
143.6

1.21
2.01
722.0
758.5
-36.5
174.0
179.9

0.94
3.00
746.0
755.4
-9.4
179.5
179.2

1.43
1.03
691.0
730.0
-39.4
166.1
173.2

2.37
2.01
735.0-740.6
789.8-772.4
-54.8-31.8
244.5-247.7
247.8-242.8

2.04
3.00
757.0
790.4
-33.4
268.2
261.2

2.71

745.3
799.4
-54.1
246.4
249.0

130

215

Less Developed Countries
Population Growth Rate(% per year)
Per capita Income Growth Rate(% per year)
Grain Production (Million Metric Tons)
Grain Consumption (Million Metric Tons)
Grain Trade (Million Metric Tons)
Food Production Index (1969-71=100)
Food Consumption Index (1969-71=100)

IV.

Alternative III

Centrally Planned Economies
Population Growth Rate(% per year)
Per capita Income Growth Rate(% per year)
Grain Production (Million Metric Tons)
Grain Consumption (Million Metric Tons)
Grain Trade (Million Metric Tons)
Food Production Index (1969-71=100)
Food Consumption Index (1969-71=100)

III.

Alternative II

1.03

World Market Weighted Real Food Prices
(Index 1969-71-= 100)

145-195

Source: The Global 2000 Report to the President, Volume Two, Tables 6-1, 6-2, 6-7 and 6-11, pp.78,
91-92 and 96.
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Per Capita Grain and Food Consumption and Daily Caloric Intake in 2000
Alternative I
Grain

Food Index

Alternative II
Food Index

Grain

Alternative III
Grain

Food Index

0969-71=

I. Industrialized Countries
of which United States
Western Europe
J'apan
II.

III.

IV.

v.

Centrall~ Planned
Countries
of which USSR
Eastern Europe
China
Less Developed
Countries
of which Latin America
N. Africa/Middle East
Other African LDC's
South Asia
Southeast Asia
East Asia
World

Daily Caloric
Consumption in Less
Developed Countries
of which
Latin America
N. Africa/Middle East
Other African LDC's
South Asia
Southeast Asia
East Asia

Source:

(1969-71==

(kgs.)

100)

139.1
917.7
124.5
163.2

619.2
154.8
518.2
401.1

110.0
107.9
110.1
138.3

495.1
976.4
1012.1
281.8

138.4
145.2
154.2
124.7

396.5
828.4
920.8
220.0

119.0
123.7
141.2
99.9

111. 0-108. 6
12:,.1-125.1
105.9-102.2
81.3-80.9
109.2-105.8
117.1-114.6
128.7-127.3

219.4
306.6
318.6
119.1
192.4
237.1
221.3

116. 7
136.7
112.9
86.3
112.5
119.2
129.7

189.5
243.8
283.7
108.8
164.9
217.9
195.5

99.9
110.8
98.4
78.S
96.4
110.0
114.2

352.0-343.2

117 .0-114.5

373.0

126.0

302.0

104.0

2370

2330

2390

2165

2935
2530
1840
2180
2400
2505

2905
2460
1830
2130
2365
2480

3080
2655
1920
2230
2425
2520

2710
2390
1800
1985
2310
2320

(1969-71-=100)

(kgs.)

100)

127.7-121.2
135.9-128.3
121.4-115.5
164.2-154.2

798.3
1363.3
599.0
481.2

267.8

135.8
141.4
152.1
119 .1

210.2-205.5
282.8-278.1
301. 8-2 92. 8
·112 .5-112 .0
186.7-181.0
233.2-228.5
219.5-217.3

(kgs.)
735.0-692.4
1183.3-1111.5
581.7-548.8
484.4-452.3

473.9
949.9
997.6

Global 2000 Report to the President, Volume Two, Tables 6-8 and 6-9., pp.93-95.
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Projections from IIASA Basic Linked System

1.

Population (Three-year
Average up to indicated
year)

2.

Rate of Growth of
Population(% per year)

Year

OECD

CMEA

1980
1990
2000

648
701
754

375
406
437

Developing Countries
World
Low
Low
Mid
Mid
(Including
Income Income Income
All
others)
389
502
637

695
891
1119

2076
2513
3023

3160
3906
4779

4338
5186
6106

1971-1980
1980-1990
1990-2000

0.79
0.79
0.73

0.90
0.80
0.71

2.63
2.59
2.38

2.58
2.51
2.28

2.12
1.91
1.86

2.28
2~13
2.03

1.84
1.80
1.63

3.94
3.57
3.15

5.99
5.33
4.87

6.24
5.89
5.84

6.09
5.70
5.67

5.24
5.09
4.80

5.77
5.51
5.39

4.63
4.31
4.04

3.

Rate of Growth of Real
GDP(% per year)

1971-1980
1980-1990
1990-2000

4.

Daily Caloric Intake*
(kilocalories)

1980
1990
2000

3335
3454
3550

3619
3628
3580

2712
2913
3059

2369
2509
2626

2310
2448
2552

2373
2522
2637

2595
2706
2787

5.

Production of Wheat*

1980
1990
2000

136
181
212

127
141
156

26
31
36

21
27
32

84
112
139

131
170
207

414
519
564

6.

Production Rice*

1980
1990
2000

15
16
18

1
2
2

10
13
16

52
67
89

158
195
224

220
275
329

241
298
355

7.

Production of Coarse*
Grains

1980
1990
2000

315
366
429

172
193
199

60
75
91

48
63
182

120
142
172

228
280
345

757
894
1040
1412
1711
1959

8.

Production of all Grains*
indicated year)

1980
1990
2000

466
563
669

300
336
357

96
119
143

121
157
203

362
449
535

579
725
881

9.

Net Exports: Wheat*
indicated year)

1980
1990
2000

55
84
102

-20
-22
-16

-10
-17
-25

-14
-23
-36

-12
-25
-40

-36
-65
-101

-46Table 6 continued:

10. Net Exports: Rice*
indicated year)
11. Net Exports: Coarse*
Grains
indicated year)
(Million Metric tons)

Year

OECD

CMEA

1980
1990
2000

2
2
2

-1
-1

1980
1990
2000

40
35

-13
-14
-12

48

Develo:Qing Countries
World
Low
Mid
Mid
Low
(Including
Income Income Income
All
others)
-1
-3
-5

-2

3

-7
-5

8

9
3
-8

-5
-10
-19

-10
-23
-39

5

-2
-5

-6
-30

-67

*3 Year average upto indicated year.

Source: Food and Agriculture Project (FAP), IIASA, private communication, June, 1984. Results a
preliminarly and likely to change and not to be quoted without permission of Project Leader, FAP,
IIASA.

-47Table 7
Proje ctions from India Model of IIASA
Alter native 1
Popul ation
(Milli ons)

1980
1990
2000

2•

Rate of Growth
of.Po pulati on
(% per year)

1971-2000
1980-2000
1990-2000

3.

Rate of Growth
of Ieal GDP
(% per year)

1971-2000
1980-2000
1990-2000

4.

Produ ction of Wheat
(Killi on Metri c tons)

5.

Produ ction of Rice
(Milli on Metri c tons)

1.

6.

Produ ction of Coarse
Grain s (Milli on Metri c
tons)

7.

Produ ction of ali
Grain s
(Killi on Metri c tons)

8.

Daily Calor ie Intake
A. Jlural Group 1·
2
3

s..:......_

iroap

l ·

670
788
927

2.249
2.232
2.206

2.057
1.980
1.980

1.808
1.637
1.637

4.746
5.349
6.077

4.752
5.356
6.090

4.756
5.363
6.100

1980
1990
2000

33
57
85

33
57
84

33
57
83

1980
1990
2000

47
68
92

47
68
92

47

1980
1990
2000

26
32
35

26
32
34

26
32
34

1980
1990
2000

106
157
212

106
157
210

106
157
209

1990
2000
1990
2000
1990
2009
2000
1990
2000

5

<

1990
2000

2

3
4

5

k>urce:

lne as for Tab le 6.

Ft' cr WV--, ~
'b:c A:'· ~

672

Alter native 3

813
995

.... 191D

4

674
843
1048

Alter native 2

19,0
2000
1990
2000
1990
2000
1990
2000

1018( 28)~
1111(2 0)
1958(17)
2125( 16)
2584(1 9)
2840(20)
2659(20)
2927(2 3)
3789(1 7)
3911(2 2)
1170( 2.1)
117l( 0.5)
165~( 5.7)
1689( 3.4)
2029.(17)
-2040( 13)
2379(3 5)
2352(3 4)
3102(4 1)
3010(4 9)

68

92

1024(2 7)
1152( 18)
1959(1 7)
2159( 16)
2588( 19)
2872(2 0)
2674(2 0)
2937( 23)
3837(1 7)
4013( 23)

1030
1183
1961
2184
2591
2897
2693
2988
3898
4174

(26)
(16)
(17)
05)
(19)
(20)
(20)
(23)
(18)
(25)

1172( 1.0)
1217( 0.4)
1657( 5.3)
1726( 2.9)
2039(1 6)

1178
1261
1664
1766
2052
2115
2419
2456
3200
3209

(0.9)
(0.3)
(4.9)
(2.3)
(15)
(11)
(34)
(32)
(44)
(55)

2073( 12)
2396( 35)
2397( 33)
3145(4 3)
3091(5 1)

-48Table 8
Projections of MOIRA

Low Growth of

High Growth of

NonAgricultural GDP

NonAgricultural GDP
2000

1990
I.

2000

Food Production (index 1980=100)

A

A.

A

A.

Developing Countries

1.31

1.26

1.89

1.71

1.22

1.47

of which Latin America

1.46

1.47

2.12

2.11

1.45

2.03

Tropical Africa

1.51

1.48

2.17

2.04

1.14

1.48

Middle East

1.33

1.31

2.29

2.15

1.18

1.81

Southern Asia

1.14

1.00

1.53

1.20

1.05

0.91

Developed Countries

1.42

1.27

1.78

1.51

1.17

1.35

of which North America

1.47

1.24

1.74

1.40

1 ;13

1.25

European Community 1.35

. 1.28

1.73

1.50

1.17

1.35

1.38

1.28

1.80

1.60

1.21

1.42

Developing Countries

1.12

1.15

1.30

1.36

0.97

0.94

of which Latin America

1.21

1.28

1.46

1.63

1.04

1.08

Tropical Africa

1.26

1.26

1.48

1.48

1.04

0.96

Kiddle East

1.21

1.23

1.54

1.67

0.98

1.07

Southern Asia

1.04

1.00

1.12

1.04

0.92

0.77

Developed Countries

1.18

1.19

1.34

1.37

1.07

1.13

of which North America

1.15

1.14

1.26

1.26

1.06

1.11

European CoDDDunity

1.17

1.18

1.31

1.34

1.07

1.12

World

1.15

1.16

1.28

1.35

1.02

1.02

World
II.

1990

Consumption per Capita
(index 1980=100)

-49III. World Price Index of Food

IV.

(1965=100)

0.75

0.44

0.98

0.22

World Population

5237

4318

6146

4722

3916

3122

4733

3484

1321

1196

1413

1238

0.74

0.71

of which Developing
countries
Developed Countries

v.

Undernourished(millions )

520

400

740

460

13

13

16

13

As a proportion of

Developing Country
Population

Note:
Source:

Column A (B) refers to reference (low) population growth scenarios.
Linnemann et al (1979) and Tables 8.2, Appendix 10A, Runs 111,112,211,

pp. 245, 306-368.

-50Table 9
IFPRI Projections
I.

Average Growth Rates

Population

Food Production

(Percent Per Year)

1975-1990

1960-75

1975-1990

(cereals) (major
staples)

A.

Food Deficit Countries

2.6

2.8

2.7

Low Income

2.6

2.6

2.4

Middle Income

2.9

3.6

3.5

High Income

2.7

2.4

2.4

2.9

4.0

4.0

2.7

3.0

2.9

of which

B. Grain Exporters

C.

II.

All 84 Countries

Variant

Food Consumption in 1990
1

2a

2b

3

567

627

649

654

Low Income

349

385

398

427

Middle Income

166

180

185

170

52

62

67

56

52

56

57

54

619

682

706

708

(Million tons)

A.

Food Deficit Countries

of which

High Income

B. Grain Exporter

C. All 84 Countries

-51.'able 9 continued

Variant

III. Gross Food Deficit in 1990*
(Million Tons)

A.

2a

2al

2b

2bl

121

103

143

133

Low Income

69

55

83

69

Middle Income

21

19

25

21

High Income

31

29

35

33

726

54

143

133

Food Deficit Countries

of which

B.

Grain Exporter

c.

All 84 Countries

*In computing gross deficit, from the imports of each group the exports within
each group have not been subtracted.

Source

IFPRI (1977), Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8, p44-63.

